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Background and aims: Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However,
there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation
in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity. Methods: In three studies, we sought to examine the
relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive
Reﬂection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale,
and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling. Results: Throughout all three studies, speciﬁc associations
were reliably established. Speciﬁcally, negative associations were observed between participants’ CRT and PGSI
scores, as well as between participants’ CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a
positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem
gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants’willingness to pay for irrelevant information in
a scratch card gambling scenario. Discussion and conclusions: Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity
is associated with an individuals’ thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing
literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior
and problematic gambling.
Keywords: scratch card gambling, problem gambling, individual differences, thinking style, Cognitive
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INTRODUCTION
Lottery gambling is a popular and widespread gambling
activity in Canada. Recent estimates suggest that 45% of
Ontario adults are regular lottery players (Ontario Lottery
and Gaming Corporation [OLG], 2016). Lottery games, as a
discrete category of gambling activities, include traditional
lottery (or “lotto”) draws in which combinations of winning
numbers are drawn daily or weekly, instant ticket or scratch
card gambling, “watch ‘n win” terminal games, and sports
games. In Canada, lottery games are available at many
retailers (e.g., grocery stores, pharmacies, convenience
stores, gas stations, etc.) and are typically associated with
a low price point. Despite their widespread popularity and
accessibility, certain types of lottery games (e.g., scratch
cards) remain relatively understudied in the literature
compared to other forms of gambling.
Although they are grouped together within the general
category of lottery products, there is a considerable amount
of heterogeneity in terms of structural characteristics within
this group of products, particularly with regard to their
potential for abuse or misuse. While a relatively high
percentage of people report playing traditional lottery games
(Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2011; Rogers, 1998), the potential
for harm related to these draws is considered to be low
(Subramaniam et al., 2016). One potential reason for this is
the protracted event frequency associated with weekly
lottery draws (the most common type of “draw” lottery),
meaning that the time between the purchase of the lottery
ticket and the outcome reveal is usually quite lengthy
(e.g., on the order of days; Short, Penney, Mazmanian, &
Jamieson, 2015). On the other end of the spectrum are
games such as “scratch cards” or “instant tickets,” which, as
their name suggests, allow for outcomes to be revealed
rather quickly (e.g., on the order of minutes; Grifﬁths, 2002;
Papoff & Norris, 2009). Another difference between tradi-
tional lottery draws and scratch card games is their capacity
for continuous play. Traditional lottery draws happen on an
orderly schedule, with most draws occurring weekly or
sometimes daily. However, once the draw is complete, there
is no other opportunity for further play. On the contrary,
scratch cards are what gambling researchers refer to as a
continuous form of gambling, offering players the opportu-
nity to continue playing after each individual game is
complete (Grifﬁths, 2002; Papoff & Norris, 2009). In line
with these features, scratch card gambling was found to
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predict problem gambling severity over and above demo-
graphic variables, whereas participation in traditional lottery
draws was not (Short et al., 2015).
Previous research has examined the relationship between
problem gambling and scratch card gambling at the popu-
lation level. A recent longitudinal study of gambling behav-
ior in Canada found that frequency of scratch card play was
predictive of problem gambling over time (Williams et al.,
2015). In a Dutch sample, the prevalence of potential
problematic scratch card gambling was estimated to be
2.68% of the sample population (DeFuentes-Merillas,
Koeter, Bethleham, Schippers, & Van Den Brink, 2003).
More recently, reports from Portugal have highlighted
concern about the stable increase in scratch card sales over
time, as well as with the characteristics of these games that
make them difﬁcult to control from a responsible gambling
perspective (Rodrigues-Silva, 2017). Finally, case studies of
pathological scratch card gamblers have been reported in the
literature (Raposo-Lima, Castro, Sousa, & Morgado, 2015).
These ﬁndings, coupled with the previously discussed
structural characteristics of scratch card games, suggest that
the relationship between problem gambling and scratch card
play warrants further exploration.
One other area of gambling research that remains under-
studied is the inﬂuence of individual differences in thinking
style, which may play a substantial role in gambling-related
cognitions and behaviors. This is demonstrated in a study of
game choice by Mouneyrac et al. (2018) in which being
male, possessing an analytic style of thinking, and a high
need for cognition were found to predict a preference for
strategic forms of gambling (e.g., poker, sports betting, and
black jack), compared to non-strategic forms of gambling
(e.g., scratch cards, slot machines, and lotteries). However,
in this study, all forms of strategic and non-strategic gam-
bling were grouped together, thus clouding the relationships
between speciﬁc individual difference variables (such as
thinking style) and speciﬁc game types (such as scratch
cards). This is problematic given the aforementioned het-
erogeneity in structural characteristics within lottery games.
One additional study has examined the relationship between
thinking style and problem gambling severity, uncovering a
negative relation between problem gambling severity and
scores on the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (AOT;
Stanovich & West, 2008), suggesting that as the endorse-
ment of open-minded thinking decreases, problem gambling
severity increases (MacLaren, Fugelsang, Harrigan, &
Dixon, 2012). Therefore, we believe that it is important to
further investigate the relationships between individual
differences in thinking style, problem gambling, and scratch
card gambling behavior.
In this series of studies, we sought to investigate how
individual differences in thinking style, as measured by the
Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), relate to
the frequency with which individuals engage in scratch card
gambling and their levels of problem gambling. One may
predict certain associations between these variables based on
previous work. Speciﬁcally, since higher scores on the
CRT reﬂect a more analytic style of thinking, one would
expect CRT scores to negatively correlate with both
scratch card gambling frequency and problem gambling
severity. In addition, we predict, consistent with past research
(DeFuentes-Merillas et al., 2003; Raposo-Lima et al., 2015;
Williams et al., 2015), that Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI) scores will correlate positively with participants’
frequency of scratch card gambling. Although these associa-
tions may be predicted based on the previous work discussed,
no studies have directly reported relationships between these
constructs, constituting a fairly large gap in the literature. In a
series of three online studies, participants completed a num-
ber of relevant individual difference measures, thus allowing
us to address the present research questions. These measures
were collected in the context of a larger investigation into
scratch
card gambling, the results of which are reported elsewhere
(Walker, Stange, Fugelsang, Koehler, & Dixon, 2018).
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we explored the associations between individual
differences in thinking style, frequency of scratch card
gambling, and problem gambling in the context of a larger
research project. Participants were presented with images of
three scratch card games, each presented alongside an infor-
mation table that displayed either a low, medium, or high
amount of unclaimed prizes (i.e., prizes still available to be
won; see Supplemenetary Materials). The scratch card games
presented mirrored real scratch card games available for
purchase in our home jurisdictation of Ontario, and thus
were taken from the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation
website (OLG, 2018). Although unclaimed prize information
feels intuitively useful, it is uninformative in the absence of
the number of cards remaining in circulation. For example, a
scratch card may have a single unclaimed prize, yet feature
only two cards remaining, making it preferable to a card that
may have 10 times as many unclaimed prizes, but features
more than 100 times the number of cards remaining. In the
scratch card gambling task, participants rated their likelihood
of winning, perceived excitement, and made hypothetical
purchases for each game without card remaining information
provided. As these three judgments addressed a different
research question than the present investigation, they are
reported elsewhere (Walker et al., 2018). Following these
judgments, participants indicated how much they would be
willing to pay for unclaimed prize information for all scratch
card games, as an index of how much they valued this
uninformative information. Finally, participants completed
the CRT (Frederick, 2005), PGSI (Ferris & Wynne, 2001),
and various demographic questions, including scratch card
gambling frequency. These latter constructs were explored to
assess whether individual differences in thinking style, will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for uninformative unclaimed prize
information, and scratch card gambling frequency related to
participants’self-reported problem gambling levels.
METHODS
Participants
A sample of 201 participants were recruited from the online
crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk to
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complete an online questionnaire. For all studies, our full
sample was recruited prior to data analysis. Participants
were recruited under the condition that they were the US
residents and received approval on 95% (or more) of their
past Mechanical Turk tasks. This study took approximately
20 min to complete and participants were remunerated with
$3.00 for their participation.
Measures
Willingness to pay (WTP). Participants indicated their WTP
for uninformative unclaimed prize information while
completing a hypothetical gambling task. Due to the unin-
formative nature of unclaimed prize information, those who
indicated that they would be willing to pay for this infor-
mation were viewed as providing a suboptimal response.
Participants were presented with three scratch card game
images (each version of a game titled “100× Multiplier”)
and were asked: “Assuming you were going to purchase ﬁve
of these scratch cards, how much money would you be
willing to pay for unclaimed prize information for all three
versions of 100×Multiplier?” Participants responded to this
item by providing a dollar amount in a free-entry text box.
Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT). The CRT (Frederick,
2005) was designed to evaluate individuals’ ability to sup-
press an intuitive incorrect response in favor of a deliberative
correct answer. Since participants from Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk are often presented with CRT problems, we elected
to use a modiﬁed version of the 3-item CRT. All three items
utilized the same mechanistic style as Frederick’s original
CRT items, but featured different numbers and objects from
the original questions. It is noteworthy that the intuitive
incorrect response for one of our modiﬁed CRT items in
Study 1 may not have been as intuitively appealing as the
original CRT item it was modeled after. This is because the
intuitive incorrect response for one modiﬁed CRT item did
not result in a round number (this was remedied in Studies 2
and 3). The exact items used can be found in the Supplemen-
tary Materials along with each items’ correct and intuitive
incorrect answers. For all CRT items, participants provided
their answers in a free-entry text box.
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). The PGSI
(Ferris &Wynne, 2001) is a subset of the Canadian Problem
Gambling Index and provides a reliable and valid measure
of problem gambling symptomatology. Participants rated
nine items addressing gambling-related harms on a scale
from 0 (never) to 3 (almost always). These individual items
were then summed resulting in an overall score for each
participant. Scores of 0 on the PGSI indicate non-problem
gambling, scores between 1 and 4 indicate low-risk gambling,
scores between 5 and 7 indicate moderate-risk gambling, and
scores of 8 and above are indicative of problem gambling
(Currie, Hodgins, & Casey, 2013).
Demographic questions. Participants provided their age,
gender, and responded to an item regarding their frequency
of scratch card gambling. The latter was based on an item in
the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (Ferris & Wynne,
2001), which assesses the frequency with which individuals
engage in various forms of gambling. The item [“In the past
12 months, how many times have you played an instant
scratch card game (e.g., “Cash for Life”)?] included eight
response options (0, 1–5, 6-10, 11–15, 16–23, or 24 or more
times in the past 12 months, I have never played this type of
game, and I prefer not to say), scaling from no involvement
in scratch card gambling to frequent scratch card gambling.
Procedure
Participants were presented with three scratch card games
that were identical with the exception of the unclaimed prize
information provided. They judged how likely they felt they
were to win and how excited they were to play each scratch
card game. Next, paricipants indicated their WTP for un-
claimed prize information and speciﬁed how many of each
scratch card they would elect to hypothetically purchase.
Finally, participants completed the demographic measures,
which asked about age, gender, and scratch card gambling
frequency, as well as CRT (Frederick, 2005) and PGSI
(Ferris & Wynne, 2001) items. As mentioned previously,
participants completed the likelihood of winning, perceived
excitement, and the hypothetical purchasing task for reasons
peripheral to the current research question. In addition,
one base rate neglect item was included for exploratory
purposes and therefore will not be discussed further.
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with
the Tri-Council Policy Statement for the Ethical Conduct for
Research Involving Humans (2nd edition). The Ofﬁce of
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo approved the
study. All participants provided informed consent before
participating.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics were analyzed for our sample along
with all presented measures in Study 1 (Table 1). Our main
analyses centered around correlating our measured vari-
ables. First, participants’ CRT scores were negatively
correlated with their frequency of scratch card gambling,
r(197)=−.140, p= .048, as well as their PGSI scores,
r(197)=−.302, p< .001. Moreover, participants’ PGSI
scores were related to their frequency of scratch card
gambling, r(195)= .229, p= .001, as well as the amount
they were willing to pay for unclaimed prize information,
r(197)= .143, p= .044. No other correlations reached sig-
niﬁcance; all correlations analyzed in Study 1 can be viewed
in Table 2.
STUDY 2
Study 2 provided us with the opportunity to improve our
measure of thinking style by including four additional CRT
items. Furthermore, modiﬁcations to the experimental task
resulted in participants now being provided with the number
of scratch cards remaining for each game allowing them to
combine this information with unclaimed prize information
in order to calculate the payback percentage (i.e., the
expected rate of return) of each presented scratch card
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game. Importantly, this change allowed us to more easily
assess participants’ ability to calculate the payback percent-
age of a scratch card game. Differences in the ability to
calculate payback percentage may relate to problem gam-
bling severity and scratch card gambling frequency, as an
understanding of this concept may inﬂuence participants’
willingness to engage in gambling behaviors. One may also
expect that CRT performance may relate to participants’
ability to calculate payback percentage, as both require some
level of mathematical ability. Finally, we sought to replicate
the observed relations from Study 1.
METHODS
Participants
A sample of 201 participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk and were remunerated with $4.00
upon completion of a 25-min online questionnaire.
All participants were recruited under the condition that they
were the US residents and had a 95% (or greater) task
approval rate on Mechanical Turk.
Measures
All measures were identical to those described in Study 1
with the following exceptions presented below.
Willingness to Pay (WTP). Due to changes in the experi-
mental task (i.e., the inclusion of scratch cards remaining
information), unclaimed prize information was no longer
uninformative in Studies 2 and 3. Therefore, we could no
longer view those participants who indicated that they
would be willing to pay for this information as providing
a suboptimal response. As such, correlations involvingWTP
were not analyzed in Studies 2 and 3.
Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT). In Study 2, we expand-
ed our CRT measure to feature seven items. This change
was made in order to attempt to increase the variability of
participants’ CRT scores relative to those obtained from
participants in Study 1. In addition, we believe that one
reason for the high CRT scores observed in Study 1 was
participants’ familiarity with our CRT items. Thus, in order
to combat this issue, we included four lesser-known CRT
items into our scale (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). The
full list of CRT items used in Study 2 can be found in the
Supplementary Materials.
Calculating payback percentage. Unlike in Study 1, the
experimental task in Study 2 provided participants with all
of the information necessary to calculate the payback
percentage of each hypothetical scratch card game
(allowing participants to optimize their scratch card
choices). Thus, unlike in Study 1, we asked participants
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Measure Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Age [mean (SD)] 33.20 (9.0) 34.42 (11.33) 39.92 (8.60)
Gender [% females] 37.3% 44.8% 33.5%
Frequency of scratch card gambling [n (%)]
Had not played 66 (33.2%) 65 (32.5%) 59 (29.5%)
1–5 times 74 (37.2%) 66 (33.0%) 74 (37.0%)
6–10 times 28 (14.1%) 26 (13.0%) 22 (11.0%)
11–15 times 12 (6.0%) 15 (7.5%) 19 (9.5%)
16–24 times 8 (4.0%) 7 (3.5%) 10 (5.0%)
24 or more 11 (5.5%) 21 (10.5%) 16 (8.0%)
Cognitive Reﬂection Test [mean (SD)] 1.9 (1.17) 3.86 (2.25) 3.61 (2.18)
Problem Gambling Severity Index [n (%)]
Non-problem gambling 125 (62.8%) 111 (57.2%) 96 (49.2%)
Low-risk gambling 54 (27.1%) 47 (24.2%) 59 (30.3%)
Moderate-risk gambling 7 (3.5%) 11 (5.7%) 13 (6.7%)
Problem gambling 13 (6.5%) 25 (12.9%) 27 (13.8%)
Willingness to pay
Mean (SD) 56.49 (412.11) – –
Median (SD) 5.00 (412.11) – –
Payback percentage calculation [n (%)] – 30 (14.9%) 31 (15.5%)
Actively open-minded thinking [mean (SD)] – – 36.38 (6.61)
Note. Descriptive statistics for all measures are presented in Studies 1–3. Categories for the frequency of scratch card gambling represent
participants’ self-reported scratch card gambling frequency in the past 12 months. The maximum score possible on the Cognitive Reﬂection
Test was 3 for Study 1 and 7 for Studies 2 and 3. Willingness to pay amounts represent average dollar values provided by participants.
Possible scores on the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale ranged from 7 to 49. SD: standard deviation.
Table 2. Study 1 correlations
1 2 3 4
1. CRT –
2. Scratch card frequency −.14* –
3. PGSI −.30*** .23** –
4. WTP −.02 −.08 .14* –
Note. Pearson’s correlations (Study 1; N= 201). CRT: Cognitive
Reﬂection Test; PGSI: Problem Gambling Severity Index; WTP:
willingness to pay.
***p< .001. **p< .01. *p< .05.
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to demonstrate their ability to properly calculate the
payback percentage of a scratch card game. Prior to asking
participants to perform this calculation, participants were
presented with a paragraph that explained what a payback
percentage is in the context of scratch card gambling.
Next, participants were asked if they would be able to
properly calculate the payback percentage of a scratch card
game, given that they had all the necessary information. If
they responded afﬁrmatively, participants were given all
relevant information and asked to calculate the correct
payback percentage of a scratch card game. Those who
attempted this calculation provided their answer in a
free-entry text box.
Procedure
Study 2 followed an identical procedure to that described in
Study 1, with the addition of an item assessing participants’
ability to correctly calculate payback percentage following
the experimental task.
RESULTS
Of the 201 participants who completed Study 2, 20 parti-
cipants had previously participated in Study 1. All analyses
were conducted with the non-naive participants both
removed and retained; however, our results were not
impacted by the presence of the non-naive participants
(i.e., the interpretation of all signiﬁcance tests were the
same with non-naive participants removed), and therefore
we retained our full sample. Sample characteristics and
descriptive statistics for all presented measures in Study 2
can be found in Table 1.
As described in Study 1, our main analysis consisted of
correlating all measured variables. As predicted, CRT scores
were shown to relate to participants’ frequency of scratch
card gambling, r(198)=−.248, p< .001, and PGSI scores,
r(192)=−.213, p= .003. Furthermore, we again observed a
signiﬁcant positive correlation between participants’ PGSI
scores and the frequency with which participants took part
in scratch card gambling, r(191) = .286, p< .001. Finally,
CRT scores were shown to be associated with partici-
pants’ ability to correctly calculate payback percentage,
r(199)= .350, p< .001. No other correlations reached sig-
niﬁcance; all correlations analyzed in Study 2 can be viewed
in Table 3.
STUDY 3
Study 3 provided us with the opportunity to extend the
results of Studies 1 and 2 by including a self-report measure
of thinking style, the AOT (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013).
The AOT is a self-report measure of participants’ preference
for open-minded thinking, distinguishing it from a
performance-based measure like the CRT. Therefore, Study
3 allowed us to measure the kinds of thinking participants
value versus the types of thinking they engage in. We
predicted that participants’ AOT scores would correlate
positively with CRT scores (as demonstrated in past
research; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), as well as
correlate negatively with PGSI scores and frequency of
scratch card gambling. Finally, we sought to once again
replicate the statistically signiﬁcant associations observed in
Studies 1 and 2.
METHODS
Participants
A sample of 200 participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk and were remunerated with $4.00 upon
completion of a 25-min online questionnaire. All partici-
pants were recruited under the condition that they were the
US residents and had a 95% (or greater) task approval rate
on Mechanical Turk.
Measures
All measures were identical to those used in Study 2 with the
exception that Study 3 featured the addition of the 7-item
AOT scale (Haran et al., 2013).
Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (AOT). The AOT
(Baron, 1993; Haran et al., 2013) was designed to assess
peoples’ beliefs about the beneﬁts of open-minded thinking,
with the ultimate goal of using peoples’ beliefs about open-
minded thinking to predict thinking behaviors. In Study 3,
participants were asked to complete the 7-item version of the
AOT by stating their level of agreement with each AOT item
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to
7 (completely agree). The full list of AOT items used in
Study 3 can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
Procedure
Study 3 followed an identical procedure to Studies 1 and 2,
with the exeption that immediately prior to completing the
study, participants in Study 3 completed seven AOT items
designed to assess their beliefs about the beneﬁts of open-
minded thinking.
RESULTS
Of the 200 participants who completed Study 3, 43 parti-
cipants had previously participated in Studies 1 or 2. All
analyses were conducted with the non-naive participants
removed and retained. When the results of these analyses
Table 3. Study 2 correlations
1 2 3 4
1. CRT –
2. Scratch card frequency −.25*** –
3. PGSI −.21** .29*** –
4. PBP calculation .35*** −.09 −.11 –
Note. Pearson’s correlations (Study 2; N = 201); replicated ﬁndings
are represented in bold. CRT: Cognitive Reﬂection Test; PGSI:
Problem Gambling Severity Index; PBP: payback percentage.
***p< .001. **p< .01.
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differed, the analyses with non-naive participants removed
were reported. Sample characteristics and descriptive
statistics for all presented measures in Study 3 can be found
in Table 1.
Once again, correlational analyses were conducted to
determine how our various measures were associated with
each other. As predicted, CRT scores were shown to relate
to participants’ frequency of scratch card gambling,
r(198)=−.194, p= .006, and PGSI scores, r(193)=
−.277, p< .001. Next, we observed a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between participants’ PGSI scores and the fre-
quency with which participants engaged in scratch card
gambling, r(193)= .484, p< .001. In addition, CRT scores
were found to be correlated with participants’ AOT scores,
r(196)= .368, p< .001, and their ability to correctly calcu-
late a scratch card’s payback percentage, r(198)= .326,
p< .001. Finally, AOT scores were shown to negatively
correlate with participants’ frequency of scratch card gam-
bling, r(196)=−.216, p= .002, and their PGSI scores,
r(192)=−.455, p< .001, but positively correlate with
their ability to correctly calculate payback percentage,
r(196)= .163, p= .022. With non-naive participants
removed, the correlation between AOT scores and scratch
card gambling frequency was attenuated and became
marginally signiﬁcant, r(153) =−.155, p= .054. No other
correlations reached signiﬁcance; all correlations analyzed
in Study 3 can be viewed in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
Across three studies, we observed a number of consistent
relationships between various gambling-related and individ-
ual difference measures. These included twice-replicated
negative associations between CRT and participants’
frequency of scratch card gambling and PGSI scores, as
well as a twice-replicated positive association between PGSI
scores and participants’ frequency of scratch card gambling.
In all three studies, we observed a small association
(Cohen, 1988) between CRT performance and the frequency
with which participants played scratch card games in their
everyday lives, suggesting that the CRT explains a small
amount of the variance in scratch card gambling frequency.
The CRT is considered to measure an individual’s ability to
override an intuitive (but incorrect) response, in order to
arrive at the correct response. Therefore, the CRT is
considered to distinguish between thinking styles, such that
individuals who score highly more frequently engage in
analytical thinking, whereas individuals who score
lower more frequently utilize intuitive thinking (Alter,
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Frederick, 2005). Based
on the small association observed, we speculate that a
propensity for engaging in analytic thinking is modestly
related to less frequent scratch card gambling. This ﬁnding
conceptually replicates Mouneyrac et al.’s (2018) ﬁnding that
analytical thinkers preferred strategic gambling games, as
opposed to non-strategic forms of gambling, such as scratch
cards. Furthermore, previous research has shown a relation-
ship between CRT performance and impulsivity, demonstrat-
ing that high CRT performers are less impulsive (Frederick,
2005). Therefore, impulsivity may also play a role in the
relationship between CRT and frequency of scratch card
gambling, such that individuals who are impulsive may score
lower on the CRT, and possibly be more inclined to impul-
sively purchase scratch cards in a point-of-sale context.
In a similar vein, in all three studies, we consistently
observed a small to moderate relation between participants’
CRT and PGSI scores, such that participants who scored
lower on the CRT scored higher on the PGSI. The results
obtained in this study suggest that individuals who are more
likely to engage in intuitive thinking experience more
gambling harm, whereas those who are more analytical in
their thinking style experience less gambling harm. Previous
research has also found an association between CRT
performance and other measures of cognitive abilities
(Frederick, 2005; Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2009;
Toplak et al., 2011). Therefore, it is possible that the relation
we observed between CRT and PGSI could reﬂect differ-
ences in cognitive ability among those who are experiencing
more gambling related harm, and vice versa (see Kaare,
Mottus, & Konstabel, 2009).
Similar to the relationship between CRT and scratch
card gambling frequency, the relationship between CRT
and PGSI may also be mediated by impulsivity. There is
a well-established relationship between impulsivity and
disordered gambling (Brevers et al., 2012; Vitaro,
Arsenault, & Tremblay, 1997). This presents the possibility
that the relationship observed in the present studies may be
reﬂective of increased impulsivity among those experienc-
ing gambling harm and among those individuals who favor
an intuitive thinking style. Future research should further
examine the relationships between these variables.
We consistently observed a small to moderate positive
association between problem gambling severity and
frequency of scratch card purchases. Consistent with this
ﬁnding, previous research has suggested that scratch card
gambling is predictive of problem gambling over time
(Williams et al., 2015). Therefore, although scratch cards
are commonly considered to be an innocuous form of
gambling, the present ﬁndings suggest that this may not
be the case. Other authors have identiﬁed various structural
characteristics of scratch cards that may make them more
harmful for some players (Grifﬁths, 2002). Our observed
correlations between PGSI and scratch card frequency
Table 4. Study 3 correlations
1 2 3 4 5
1. CRT –
2. Scratch card
frequency
−.19** –
3. PGSI −.28*** .48*** –
4. PBP
calculation
.33*** .05 .09 –
5. AOT .37*** −.22** −.46*** .16* –
Note. Pearson’s correlations (Study 3; N = 200) with non-naive
participants included; replicated ﬁndings are represented in bold.
CRT: Cognitive Reﬂection Test; PGSI: Problem Gambling
Severity Index; PBP: payback percentage; AOT: Actively Open-
Minded Thinking Scale.
***p< .001. **p< .01. *p< .05.
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support this notion. However, it remains unknown whether
individuals who report more frequent scratch card purchases
consequently experience more harm from their gambling, or
if individuals experiencing more gambling harm seek out
scratch cards more frequently. The ﬁnding that problem
gamblers frequently engage in multiple forms of gambling
may account for this observation (Binde, Romild, &
Volberg, 2017), suggesting that gamblers who experience
more harm simply seek out many other forms of gambling.
Future research should attempt to clarify the speciﬁcity and
directionality of this relationship.
A small correlation between PGSI and WTP for un-
claimed prize information was observed in Study 1. That is,
as individuals’ self-reported problem gambling severity
increased, so too did their WTP increasingly large amounts
for unclaimed prize information (an uninformative piece of
information both in Study 1 and in the real-world context of
scratch card gambling where such information is routinely
made available). Relatedly, problem gamblers have been
shown to be more susceptible to a range of erroneous
cognitions associated with gambling games (Källmén,
Andersson, & Andren, 2008; Toneatto, 1999). This over-
valuing of unclaimed prize information parallels ﬁndings
within the disordered gambling literature that shows a
relationship between problem gambling severity and en-
dorsement of the gambler’s fallacy (Källmén et al., 2008;
Rogers, 1998), essentially overvaluing previous outcomes
that have no bearing on future outcomes within a gambling
scenario. It is possible that the overvaluing of uninformative
information within the context of our scratch card gambling
scenario reﬂects similar differences in information proces-
sing as is the case with other erroneous cognitions within the
gambling domain. However, as always, one should be
cautious when drawing conclusions on the basis of small,
unreplicated correlations.
In Study 3, we included an additional individual differ-
ence measure, the AOT. The pattern of correlations ob-
served with the AOT parallel those observed with the CRT.
Speciﬁcally, similar to the CRT, participants’ AOT scores
showed small to moderate negative relations with problem
gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency.
These ﬁndings suggest that endorsing open-minded thinking
relates to gambling-relevant measures in a similar manner as
analytical thinking (as measured by the CRT). In support of
this idea, we found a moderate positive association between
AOT and CRT scores.
Limitations
Although replicable, some of our observed correlations
were small in magnitude, suggesting that we are only
explaining a small percentage of variance in these cases.
As such, one should exercise caution when interpreting
these ﬁndings. Other associations observed were small to
moderate in magnitude (Cohen, 1988), or moderate to large
(Hemphill, 2003) depending on the convention used. Due
to the real-world implications of the reported associations
(e.g., assocations with self-perceived gambling harm),
we feel that our ﬁndings have practical signiﬁcance
despite being small to moderate in magnitude. Furthermore,
another limitation of the current investigation is that it
was conducted as part of a larger research project, and
thus was not the sole focus of the data collection
(i.e., participants completed unrelated tasks during the
study). However, the analyses reported here were exclu-
sively conducted for the purpose of this study and are not
reported elsewhere.
CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, we repeatedly observed associations
between gambling-related measures, with a speciﬁc focus
on scratch card gambling, and individual differences in
thinking style. Speciﬁcally, we found consistent negative
relations between participants’ CRT scores and their
frequency of scratch card gambling, as well as their problem
gambling severity. Furthermore, with problem gambling
severity, we observed a consistent positive relation with
scratch card gambling frequency. As a whole, these results
suggest associations between individual differences in
thinking style, frequency of scratch card gambling
behavior, and problematic gambling.
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